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Abstract
Illinois recently defined juvenile de facto life sentences as any
sentence imposed on a juvenile offender that is greater than 40
years in length. This comment explores the state and federal law
related to juvenile de facto life sentencing, the history behind it, and
the ways in which juvenile de facto life sentencing may be
determined. Ultimately, this comment proposes that new
legislation be introduced in Illinois that properly analyzes and
defines what a de facto life sentence is and addresses how juvenile
offenders should be provided meaningful opportunities for release.

I.

INTRODUCTION

One moment in a child’s life can determine whether they have
the chance to grow up free or whether they will be confined to a life
behind bars. In 1985, Terry Sanders was a 17-year-old boy who was
ordered by two people, holding guns, to tie up and kill a man.1 He
complied by inflicting superficial wounds and hitting the man on
the head with a hammer; however, a different man ended up being
killed.2 Terry ran to the police when given the chance, but he was
still convicted of murder and attempted murder for helping these
people.3 Terry was sentenced to 100 years in prison.4 Similarly, in
2009, a 16-year-old boy, Dimitri Buffer, shot a woman he believed
to be a rival gang member.5 He was sentenced to 50 years in prison.6
These are just a few examples of Illinois children who may spend
their entire life in prison for the haunting mistakes they made
during their childhood.
A de facto life sentence is a prison sentence that is not explicitly
stated to be a life sentence, but includes a “mandatory term-of-years
sentence that cannot be served in one lifetime.”7 In 2016, the
Supreme Court of Illinois held that subjecting juveniles to serve de
facto life sentences is unconstitutional.8
This comment will discuss how to determine what prison
sentences should be deemed a juvenile de facto life sentence. Part
II of this comment explains what a de facto life sentence is. In
addition, Part II will detail how the Eighth Amendment has
* Juris Doctor, UIC John Marshall Law School, May 2020; B.S. Southern
Illinois University Carbondale, December 2016.
1. People v. Sanders, 56 N.E.3d 563, 564 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016).
2. Id. at 564-65.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 571.
5. People v. Buffer, 75 N.E.3d 470, 471, 473 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).
6. Id. at 475.
7. People v. Reyes, 63 N.E.3d 884, 888 (Ill. 2016).
8. Id. at 888.
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influenced the United States Supreme Court to consider juveniles’
youthful mitigating traits during sentencing. Then, it will discuss
how Illinois has interpreted the United States Supreme Court’s
rulings in regard to juvenile de facto life sentences. Part III of this
comment details how the United States Supreme Court, federal
circuit courts, and some state courts rule on de facto life sentencing.
Part III also analyzes different ways to determine what a de facto
life sentence is, whether it focuses on a term of years served or an
age the juvenile offender will be by the time of release. Finally, Part
IV will propose a new standard for determining de facto life
sentences in Illinois. Specifically, it will propose an age that
provides all juveniles with a “meaningful opportunity for release,”
rather than an opportunity to live one day outside of prison before
death.9

II. BACKGROUND
There are three major United States Supreme Court decisions
that have established that juveniles are different from adults, and
therefore an offender’s age should be factored into juvenile
sentencing.10 This section explores the recent history of federal and
Illinois law on juvenile sentencing.

A. The Eighth Amendment Ban on Cruel and Unusual
Punishment
Condemning juvenile offenders to life in prison without the
possibility of parole violates proportionality principles,11 and in
effect, the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual
punishment.12 The Eighth Amendment states that “[e]xcessive bail

9. “[The] state must . . . give defendants like Graham some meaningful
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation.” Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010).
10. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-71 (2005); Graham, 560 U.S. at 7778; Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 480 (2012).
11. “Traditionally, the Court has employed a bifurcated mode of
proportionality analysis, applying much stricter rules for capital sentences-leading to the axiom, ‘death is different.’ By contrast, when facing a term of
incarceration, an offender must show that her sentence is ‘grossly
disproportionate’ to implicate Eighth Amendment protections.” Sean Craig,
Juvenile Life Without Parole Post-Miller: The Long, Treacherous Road Towards
a Categorical Rule, 91 WASH. U.L. REV. 379, 385 (2013).
12. American Jurisprudence has described the unconstitutionality of
juvenile life without parole as follows:
A sentencing scheme that punishes offenders who commit
murder when they are under the age of 18 by imposing a
mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of
parole wholly precludes consideration of the unique
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shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.”13 “Embodied in the Constitution’s
ban on cruel and unusual punishment is the ‘precept of justice that
punishment for a crime should be graduated and proportioned to
[the] offense.’”14 In measuring whether a sentence is
unconstitutional, a court looks to the proportionality and “evolving
standards of decency” concerning the offense committed.15
Proportionality focuses on the question of whether the
sentence is so “grossly disproportionate” that the punishment is
cruel and unusual.16 This standard has two classifications: the
length of the prison sentence and the categorical rules that limit
cruel and unusual punishment.17 In the cases concerning cruel and
unusual punishment, the United States Supreme Court weighed
the gravity of the offense against the sentence imposed.18 The Court
would only consider the length of the sentence itself if it found that
the gravity of the offense was grossly disproportionate to the
sentence imposed.19 In considering sentence length, courts make an
intrajurisdictional analysis20 and an interjurisdictional analysis,21
while also considering the jurisdiction’s sentencing possibilities and
outcomes.22
The Eighth Amendment standard of cruelty is a moral
judgment that changes as the values of society change.23 These
evolving standards of decency are mainly measured by “objective
indicia of a national consensus on what constitutes a proportional
characteristics of juvenile offenders and disregards the
possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most
suggest it. Such a sentencing scheme violates the principle of
proportionality and, therefore, the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 878 (2018) [hereinafter Criminal Law].
13. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
14. Graham, 560 U.S. at 59 (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,
367 (1910)).
15. Kelly Scavone, How Long is Too Long?: Conflicting State Responses to De
Facto Life Without Parole Sentences After Graham v. Florida and Miller v.
Alabama, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3439, 3445 (2014).
16. Craig, supra note 11, at 384-385.
17. Mary Berkheiser, Death is Not so Different After All: Graham v. Florida
and the Court's "Kids are Different" Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 36 VT.
L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2011).
18. The gravity of the offense includes both “the nature of the offense” and
“the culpability of the offender.” Alison Siegler & Barry Sullivan, "’Death is
Different’ No Longer": Graham v. Florida and the Future of Eighth Amendment
Challenges to Noncapital Sentences, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 327, 334 (2010).
19. Id.
20. Intrajurisdictional analysis: “sentences imposed on other criminals in
the same jurisdiction[.]” Id.
21. Interjurisdictional analysis: “sentences imposed for commission of the
same crime in other jurisdictions[.]” Id.
22. Id.
23. Criminal Law, supra note 12, at § 852.
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punishment for a particular offense.”24 Federal and state-made
legislation are the best source of this indicia.25 However, jury
practice, public opinion surveys, professional organizations’
opinions, and international views are also considered in
determining the evolving standards of decency.26

B. The United States Supreme Court Declared that
Children are Different
Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. Alabama
are all based on the precept that “children are different than
adults.”27 These differences make the penological reasons behind
sentencing adults to life in prison less effective and less purposeful
when doing the same to juveniles.28 Research on these differences
indicate that juveniles’ “developmental immaturity” may require
sentencing them differently under the Eighth Amendment.29
1. Roper v. Simmons
In 2005, the United States Supreme Court decided Roper v.
Simmons, which held that it was unconstitutional to sentence
someone under 18 years old at the time of their offense to death.30
The Court found that sentencing a juvenile to death is a violation of
both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.31 The Court further
reasoned that capital sentences are restricted to only those
offenders who commit both an extremely serious crime and have the
culpability that makes them deserving of said punishment.32 It then
established an “underlying principle that the death penalty is
reserved for a narrow category of crimes and offenders.”33
The Roper Court acknowledged three major differences
between juveniles and adults that support the conclusion that
juveniles cannot reliably be classified as “among the worst

24. Joanna H. D'Avella, Death Row for Child Rape? Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Under the Roper-Atkins "Evolving Standards of Decency"
Framework, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 139 (2006).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 139, 141.
27. Gene Griffin & Sarah Sallen, Considering Child Trauma Issues in
Juvenile Court Sentencing, 34 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 1, 1–2 (2014).
28. Id.
29. Marsha Levick et al., The Eighth Amendment Evolves: Defining Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Through the Lens of Childhood and Adolescence, 15
U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 285, 293 (2012).
30. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 568.
33. Id. at 569.
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offenders” deserving of capital punishment.34 First, juveniles often
make reckless decisions because they have “[a] lack of maturity and
an underdeveloped sense of responsibility[.]”35 Second, “juveniles
have less control, or less experience with control, over their own
environment” than adults do.36 This causes juveniles to be “more
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside
pressures, including peer pressure.”37 Lastly, “the character of a
juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult. The personality
traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.”38
Using these characteristics, it is unlikely that even juveniles
who commit “a heinous crime” show “irretrievably depraved
character” because they are still in the developmental stages.39 The
Court applied the characteristics of juveniles to the two main
purposes for capital sentences: “retribution and deterrence of
capital crimes by prospective offenders.”40 It found retribution is not
proportional to an offender “whose culpability or blameworthiness
is diminished . . . by reason of youth[.]”41 Moving on to the second
purpose, deterrence, it was not clear whether the death penalty was
deterring other juveniles.42 Characteristics of youth suggest that
juveniles are “less susceptible to deterrence[,]” just as they suggest
that juveniles are “less culpable than adults[.]”43
The Court found that states should not ask jurors to make the
choice of whether to subject a juvenile to the death penalty when
psychiatrists are forbidden from diagnosing those under age 18 with
antisocial personality disorders.44 “It is difficult even for expert
psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose
crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare
juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”45
These reasons supported the holding that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments render a death sentence for those
offenders under the age of 18 unconstitutional.46
2. Graham v. Florida
Five years later, in 2010, the United States Supreme Court
34. Id.
35. Id. (citing to Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
36. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 570.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 571 (quoting Atkins v. Va., 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)).
41. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 573.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 578.
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decided Graham v. Florida.47 In Graham, the Court found that
sentencing juvenile, nonhomicide offenders to life sentences without
the possibility of parole was a violation of the Constitution.48 The
petitioner was Terrance Jamar Graham.49 He was sentenced to life
after he was found guilty of committing both an armed robbery and
an attempted robbery on the same night while on probation, just six
months after being released from jail for his first attempted
robbery.50 The night he engaged in the second round of robberies,
Graham was 34 days away from turning 18 years old.51 He received
the maximum sentences for his crimes: “life imprisonment for the
armed burglary and 15 years for the attempted armed robbery.”52
There was no option for parole in Florida, so Graham’s sentence was
life without the possibility of parole.53 When making its decision,
the trial court stated they believed there was no deterring Graham
from the “escalating pattern of criminal conduct” he was already
engaging in.54
Graham presented a new issue in the United States Supreme
Court that had not yet been considered: “a categorical challenge to
a term-of-years sentence.”55 When adopting a new categorical
sentencing rule, the Court had to first determine whether there was
a national consensus disproving of the categorical sentence and
next, it had to decide, independently, whether the sentencing was
unconstitutional.56 Because this was a categorical sentence that
affects juvenile offenders who commit a variety of different crimes,
an analysis between the crime committed and the penalty received
would not work in determining the constitutionality of the
sentence.57 The Court instead looked at legislation and actual
sentencing and found that sentencing juveniles who commit
nonhomicide crimes to life without parole was very rare; the Court
then concluded that this meant a national consensus had developed
against this type of sentencing.58
47. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 82 (holding that sentencing a juvenile
nonhomicide offender to life without parole is unconstitutional without
providing some meaningful opportunity for release).
48. Id. at 82.
49. Id. at 53.
50. Id. at 53-55.
51. Id. at 55.
52. Id. at 57.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 61. This is different from Roper where the Court dealt with a
categorical challenge to juveniles who received the death penalty rather than a
term-of-years sentence. Id.; see also Roper 543 U.S. at 555 (considering “whether
it is permissible under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States to execute a juvenile offender who was older
than 15 but younger than 18 when he committed a capital crime”).
56. Graham, 560 U.S. at 61.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 62-67.
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Next, when making its own determination about the
constitutionality of juvenile life sentences without parole for
nonhomicide offenders, the Court first examined the category of
juvenile offenders by reiterating the three characteristics of youth
discussed in Roper, and recognizing it had previously stated
nonhomicide offenders are “less deserving of the most serious forms
of punishment[.]”59 The Court then examined the sentence being
imposed, reiterating that a sentence of life without parole is “the
second most severe penalty permitted by law” because “[i]t deprives
the convict of the most basic liberties without giving hope of
restoration[.]”60 The Court pointed out that this is “an especially
harsh punishment for a juvenile[,]” as a much greater portion of a
juvenile’s life is spent in prison when compared to the life of an adult
offender sentenced to life without parole.61
The Court reinforced its decision by discussing that none of the
penal justifications – retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or
rehabilitation – have been recognized as justifications for
sentencing juvenile nonhomicide offenders to life without parole.62
While recognizing that juvenile offenders may be incorrigible and
may have to spend the rest of their life in prison, the Court
emphasized the importance of allowing juvenile offenders to
demonstrate that they have changed63:
A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a
juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime. What the State
must do, however, is give defendants like Graham some meaningful
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation. It is for the State, in the first instance, to explore the
means and mechanisms for compliance. It bears emphasis, however,
that while the Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a
life without parole sentence on a juvenile nonhomicide offender, it
does not require the State to release that offender during his natural
life. Those who commit truly horrifying crimes as juveniles may turn
out to be irredeemable, and thus deserving of incarceration for the
duration of their lives. The Eighth Amendment does not foreclose the
possibility that persons convicted of nonhomicide crimes committed
before adulthood will remain behind bars for life. It does prohibit
States from making the judgment at the outset that those offenders
never will be fit to reenter society.64

59. Id. at 68.
60. Id. at 69-70.
61. Id. at 70 (“A 16-year-old and a 75-year-old each sentenced to life without
parole receive the same punishment in name only.”).
62. Id. at 71-74.
63. Id. at 72-73.
64. Id. at 75. This “meaningful opportunity for release” becomes an
important staple in this comment’s determination of Illinois law. This term is
used in deciding whether there are safeguards that provide juveniles with a
“meaningful opportunity for release,” or whether the law is not providing an
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In conclusion, the Court decided that Graham’s sentence
provided him with no meaningful opportunity for release, that no
showing of maturity or growth would allow Graham an opportunity
for parole given his current sentence, and that Graham’s sentence
was ultimately unconstitutional.65 The Court further imposed a
categorical rule that prohibited children under the age of 18 to be
sentenced to life without parole when committing nonhomicide
crimes.66
3. Miller v. Alabama
Finally, in 2012, the United States Supreme Court decided
Miller v. Alabama, which held that all courts, state and federal,
must consider youth and attendant characteristics before
sentencing a juvenile offender to life without parole.67 In Miller, two
14-year-old boys received life in prison without the possibility of
parole because the state sentencing laws mandated life in prison for
the homicide crimes committed.68 The Court found neither the
Roper nor Graham analyses limited the “diminished culpability” of
juveniles to only certain crimes – thus, they apply to homicide
offenses as well.69
The United States Supreme Court further found that
mandatory sentencing statutes, which subject a juvenile to life in
prison without the possibility of parole, absent allowing a
sentencing court to consider youth as a mitigating factor, directly
violates the principle set forth in Roper and Graham: “that
imposition of a State's most severe penalties on juvenile offenders
cannot proceed as though they were not children.”70 The Court
stressed the importance that a sentencing judge must first consider
opportunity to show the offender’s growth and maturity. See infra note 112 and
accompanying text (finding there was no “meaningful opportunity for release”
for an offender when his earliest opportunity for release would occur after his
“average life expectancy”); see also infra note 161 and accompanying text
(noting those juveniles or offenders who can show examples of growth or change
should be given a “meaningful opportunity for release”).
65. Graham, 560 U.S. at 79.
66. Id. at 82.
67. Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-80, 489.
68. Id. at 465. Both petitioners here were sentenced to life without parole.
Id. Their fate was set as soon as a guilty verdict was rendered because the
states’ laws required mandatory life sentences for the crimes committed by the
petitioners. Id. at 466, 469. Both 14-year-old boys were charged as adults. Id. at
466, 468-69. Petitioner one, Kuntrell Jackson, was convicted of “capital felony
murder and aggravated robbery.” Id. at 465-66. Petitioner two, Evan Miller,
was convicted of “murder in the course of arson.” Id. at 469. Both crimes of
capital murder in Arkansas, and murder in the course of arson in Alabama,
require mandatory minimum sentences of life without parole according to their
states’ sentencing statutes. Id. at 469.
69. Id. at 471, 473.
70. Id. at 474.
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“any mitigating qualities of youth” before sentencing a juvenile to
life without the possibility of parole.71
That is not to say that the Court made it impossible to sentence
a juvenile offender to life without the possibility of parole. Rather,
it may only occur if the sentencing judge found the juvenile was
irreparably corrupt, even after examining the mitigating factors of
youth:
[G]iven all we have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision about
children's diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change,
we think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this
harshest possible penalty will be uncommon. That is especially so
because of the great difficulty we noted in Roper and Graham of
distinguishing at this early age between “the juvenile offender whose
crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare
juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”
Although we do not foreclose a sentencer's ability to make that
judgment in homicide cases, we require it to take into account how
children are different, and how those differences counsel against
irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.72

4. Montgomery v. Louisiana
Four years later, the United States Supreme Court decided
that the holding in Miller v. Alabama applies retroactively.73 In
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 17-year-old Henry Montgomery, was
sentenced to a mandatory sentence of life without parole after
killing a deputy sheriff in 1963.74 He sought relief after Miller was
decided, which was almost 50 years after being taken into custody.75
The Court found that Montgomery’s statements to the Court
discussing “his evolution from a troubled, misguided youth to a
model member of the prison community” could be used “to
demonstrate [his] rehabilitation.”76 The Court concluded that
“prisoners like Montgomery must be given the opportunity to show
their crime did not reflect irreparable corruption; and, if it did not,
their hope for some years of life outside prison walls must be
restored.”77 Specifically, all people who were sentenced as juveniles
to life in prison without the possibility of parole were now able to
challenge their sentences, even if they were sentenced before
2012.78
71. Id. at 476 (citing Johnson, 509 U.S. at 367).
72. Id. at 479-80 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 573; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68).
73. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016).
74. Id. at 725-26.
75. Id. at 726.
76. Id. at 736.
77. Id. at 736-37.
78. Because Montgomery holds that Miller applies retroactively, the holding
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C. Illinois Legislation and Court Decisions
1. Supreme Court of Illinois
The Supreme Court of Illinois also held that Miller applies
retroactively to juveniles sentenced before Miller was decided.79
Placing juveniles in a category of people that cannot be subjected to
certain sentencing, life without the possibility of parole made the
Miller holding retroactively applicable.80 In 2016, the Supreme
Court of Illinois went even further, and made juvenile de facto life
sentences unconstitutional.81 The court stated:
A mandatory term-of-years sentence that cannot be served in one
lifetime has the same practical effect on a juvenile defendant's life as
would an actual mandatory sentence of life without parole—in either
situation, the juvenile will die in prison. Miller makes clear that a
juvenile may not be sentenced to a mandatory, unsurvivable prison
term without first considering in mitigation his youth, immaturity,
and potential for rehabilitation.82

It held that the defendant’s sentence was a de facto life sentence
because he would not have an opportunity for release until he
reached 105 years old.83 Therefore, finding that de facto life
sentences were unconstitutional under Miller, the court vacated the
defendant’s sentence.84
2. Appellate Court of Illinois
In 2018, the Appellate Court of Illinois used the principles
adopted by their supreme court as they applied to aggregate
sentencing.85 In People v. Pearson, the defendant was a 15-year-old
in Miller now applies to those juveniles sentenced before Miller was decided in
2012. Id. at 736; Miller, 132 U.S. 460 (decided June 25, 2012); see also
Retroactive, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining a “retroactive”
ruling as “extending in scope or effect to matters that have occurred in the
past”).
79. People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709, 722 (Ill. 2014).
80. Id.
81. See Reyes, 63 N.E.3d at 888 (holding the de facto life sentence of a
juvenile offender is unconstitutional).
82. Id. at 888.
83. Id. “[D]efendant will most certainly not live long enough to ever become
eligible for release. Unquestionably, then, under these circumstances,
defendant's term-of-years sentence is a mandatory, de facto life-without-parole
sentence.” Id.
84. Id.
85. People v. Pearson, 116 N.E.3d 304, 315-16 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018). In
applying these principles, the Appellate Court of Illinois recognized:
[T]here is no substantive difference between a mandatory
aggregate sentence of 97 years in prison, to be served almost
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offender who was sentenced to a total of 50 years in prison.86
However, the court held that because the defendant would be
released at age 55, the sentence was constitutional and valid.87 In
dicta, the court mentioned that this problem could be solved
altogether if the legislature would enact a statute that requires
juvenile offenders be considered for parole after a certain term of
years.88
Similarly, in People v. Rodriguez, the defendant, a 15-year-old
offender, was sentenced to consecutive sentences totaling to 65
years in prison.89 The court found that defendants who may be
released in their mid-sixties were generally not subjected to a de
facto life sentence; however, the defendant here was looking at a
release closer to age 80.90 “Although defendant’s offenses were not
part of a single course of conduct,” the court still found that Miller
applied to the defendant’s consecutive sentencing.91 As a result, the
defendant’s sentence was vacated and remanded for a new sentence
that was in line with Illinois law.92
3. Section 5-4-5.5-105 of the Illinois Unified Code of
Corrections
Illinois courts are not the only governmental body in Illinois
trying to change the juvenile sentencing system.93 Four years after

Id.

in its entirety, and a sentence of mandatory life in prison. In
both cases, the juvenile defendant will spend the rest of his
life in prison with no possibility of parole in his lifetime.

86. Id. at 306-07.
87. Id. at 317.
88. Id. at 316. Here, the court suggested Illinois could solve the issue of de
facto life sentencing by enacting a statute that would require juvenile offenders
to have the possibility of parole after a certain term of years. Id. See infra note
180 for an example of legislation that resembles what the court suggested here,
only in a statute that California enacted, CAL. PENAL CODE § 3051 (Deering
2020). Recently, Illinois also enacted a statute requiring certain juvenile
offenders to have a possibility of parole after a certain number of years is served.
See infra Part III.B (discussing 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-115 (2020), a
recent Illinois statute that imposes parole possibilities for juvenile offenders
after a certain time period has been served).
89. People v. Rodriguez, 118 N.E.3d 557, 569 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018).
90. Id. at 570-71.
91. Id. at 571-72. The “defendant was sentenced to 45 years” for
participating in a drive-by shooting that resulted in murder. Id. at 559. This
“included a 25-year enhancement for personally discharging the firearm.” Id.
The defendant received an additional 20-year sentence for an unrelated
“attempted first degree murder.” Id. at 560.
92. Id. at 573.
93. See, for example, 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-105 (2017) (regarding the
“sentencing of individuals under the age of 18 at the time of the commission of
an offense”).
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Miller, the Illinois General Assembly enacted a new sentencing law,
section 5-4-5.5-105 of the Unified Code of Corrections,94 which
requires that certain factors be considered when sentencing
juveniles.95 This law applies to current sentencing of juveniles and
resentencing under Miller.96 In effect, in Illinois if someone
sentenced as a juvenile is serving a de facto life sentence, then they
must be resentenced using the guidelines set forth in the new
Illinois statute.97
Although it is unconstitutional to sentence a juvenile to life in
prison, many of them will still spend their entire life behind bars.98
“There is no national legal standard on how many years is too many
for a juvenile to serve.”99 “The United States Sentencing
Commission considers a 39-year prison sentence the equivalent of
life.”100 In December of 2017, there were at least 167 prisoners
serving minimum sentences of 50 years for crimes they committed
as juveniles.101 The Supreme Court of Illinois determined in Buffer
that 40 years is the maximum term-of-years sentence a juvenile
offender can receive without the sentence being considered a de
facto life sentence.102
Like Illinois, several federal circuit courts have determined
that de facto life sentences are unconstitutional.103 However, some
federal circuit courts narrowly read the Miller decision and find that
juvenile de facto life sentences are still constitutional.104 Other
94. Id.
95. “In general, the new statute requires the sentencing judge to take into
account several factors in mitigation in determining the appropriate sentence
for those under 18. In addition, the statute provides that the imposition of
firearm enhancements is a matter of discretion with the trial court[.]” Reyes, 63
N.E.3d at 889.
96. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-105.
97. Id.
98. Emily Hoerner & Jeanne Kuang, Less Than Life, INJUSTICE WATCH
(May 6, 2018), www.injusticewatch.org/features/illinois-juvenile-offenders-lifewithout-parole/. As of December 2017, there were at least 167 prisoners serving
50 years or more for crimes they committed as juveniles. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. People v. Buffer, 137 N.E.3d 763, 774 (Ill. 2019).
103. See Reyes, 63 N.E.3d at 888 (holding the de facto life sentence of a
juvenile offender is unconstitutional); United States v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131, 151
(3d Cir. 2018), reh’g granted 905 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2018) (using retirement age
as a factor to determine when a term-of-years sentence became the equivalent
to a life sentence); Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184, 1191-92, 1194, (9th Cir. 2013),
reh’g denied 742 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding juvenile offender’s
discretionary 254-year sentence without the possibility of parole in his lifetime
is “materially indistinguishable” from a life sentence without parole and
unconstitutional under Graham); Budder v. Addison, 851 F.3d 1047, 1049, 1059
(10th Cir. 2017) (finding 16-year-old juvenile offender’s sentence
unconstitutional under Graham when he would not be eligible for parole until
he served 131.75 years of his sentence).
104. See United States v. Walton, 537 F. App’x 430, 437 (5th Cir. 2013)
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federal circuit courts hold that juvenile de facto life sentences are
unconstitutional, but will find other reasons for deeming a lengthy
term-of-years sentence constitutional.105 This comment will analyze
these choices and propose a new way for Illinois to define and
regulate juvenile de facto life sentences.

III. ANALYSIS
A. Illinois Defines De Facto Life Sentences in People v.
Buffer
1. The Majority Relies on the Legislature
In People v. Buffer, the petitioner, Dimitri Buffer, shot a young
woman because she was in a car similar to a rival gang member’s
vehicle.106 Buffer was 16 years old when his friend recognized a car
carrying rival gang members as members of the gang who had
“jumped him.”107 Buffer was later stopped at a stop sign when he
saw, what he thought to be, the car holding rival gang members
from earlier.108 Buffer walked up to the car, fired gun shots into the
vehicle, and ran back to his vehicle.109 Instead of shooting rival gang
members, Buffer shot Jessica Bazan twice in her right thigh, which
eventually caused her death.110 Despite having the mitigating
(determining that Graham and Miller do not prohibit a “discretionary federal
sentence for a term of years”); Goins v. Smith, 556 F. App’x 434, 440 (6th Cir.
2014) (holding that neither Roper nor Graham impose an Eighth Amendment
categorical ban on an aggregate term of years juvenile sentence, and Miller
similarly does not require this ban); Starks v. Everlasting, 659 F. App’x 277,
280 (6th Cir. 2016) (asserting the United States Supreme Court has not
extended Eighth Amendment protections to discretionary “juvenile sentences
that are the functional equivalent of life”); United States v. Jefferson, 816 F.3d
1016, 1018-19 (8th Cir. 2016) (finding that Miller only prohibits mandatory
sentencing schemes of life without parole rather than discretionary, nonmandatory juvenile life without parole sentences).
105. See Contreras v. Davis, 716 F. App’x 160, 163 (4th Cir. 2017) (finding a
possibility of release “under Virginia’s geriatric release program” was a
“meaningful opportunity to receive parole”); Juarez v. Davis, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 79996, at *14 (N.D. Tex.) (holding a prison sentence that offered the
chance of parole after serving 40 years in prison was constitutional).
106. Dimitri’s friend, Aisha Jones, testified that Dimitri thought he was
shooting at a rival gang member who attacked his friend. Buffer, 75 N.E.3d at
473. Jones testified that “when the petitioner’s brother mentioned a woman, the
petitioner told him that he ‘shot a King’ and ‘didn't shoot no lady.’” Id.
107. Id. at 471, 473. The rival gang members hit Buffer’s friend in the face
several times after confirming that he was a member of a rival gang. Id. at 472.
108. Id. at 473.
109. Id. at 472.
110. Id. at 471-72.
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factors of being a young teenager and having a supportive family,
the court sentenced him to 50 years in prison.111 Buffer challenged
his sentencing, and as a result, the appellate court decided he
should be resentenced as he would likely die in prison under his
current sentence.112
This issue was brought before the Supreme Court of Illinois in
April of 2019, leading it to draw an official line for de facto life
sentences at 40 years.113 The court justified drawing this line by
citing to Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Roper, “’[C]lear, predictable,
and uniform constitutional standards are especially desirable’ in
applying the Eighth Amendment.”114
The State argued that the line drawn for de facto life sentences
should be in the “54-to-59-year range[.]”115 The defendant
responded that “the State’s ‘survivability’ standard is ‘arbitrary,
unjustified, and unworkable.’”116 Both parties disagreed as to
whether or not “actuarial tables and other statistical data”

Id.

111. Id. at 474-75.
In mitigation, defense counsel argued that the petitioner
was remorseful, that he was 16 years old at the time of the
shooting, that his parents have been present in court and in
his “entire life,” that he has no history of mental illness, and
that he struggled with school but had completed two years of
high school with special assistance classes. In addition,
defense counsel explained that the defendant's previous
arrests can be explained by the fact that he “exists in a world
where there is violence” and “senseless deaths.” Counsel also
emphasized that the petitioner was not alone and that he was
very susceptible to the influence of others.
The State argued that the petitioner's arrests as a minor
showed “the making of a gang member” and contended that
the petitioner “had choices at the age of 14 and yet continued
again and again to commit crimes.” The State claimed that
the petitioner "chose to be a Black P Stone" and that he
“chose to have that life.” The State further argued for an
extended sentence in order “to deter others from
committing the same crime” and “to send a message” to the
community and to gang members. As the State explained,
“these sentences are necessary to deter others from that
conduct.”

112. Id. at 482, 485. In deciding Buffer’s sentence was unconstitutional, the
appellate court explained:
[T]he petitioner's projected parole date is May 12, 2059, at
which point he will be 66 years old. The petitioner's projected
discharge date is May 12, 2062, at which point he will be
69. Accordingly, as a practical matter, the petitioner, whose
average life expectancy is at best 64 years, will not have a
meaningful opportunity for release.
Id. at 482.
113. Buffer, 137 N.E.3d at 774.
114. Id. at 771 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at. 594 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
115. Id. at 771-72.
116. Id. at 772.
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supported their arguments, as well as whether or not it should even
be used in the process of determining “survivability.”117
The Supreme Court of Illinois reiterated the appellate court’s
reasoning for finding a de facto life sentence was that “geriatric
release d[id] not provide a juvenile with a meaningful opportunity
to demonstrate the maturity and rehabilitation required to obtain
release and reenter society.”118 However, the Supreme Court of
Illinois decided to rely instead on the Illinois General Assembly
when drawing the line for de facto life sentences.119 The court used
federal common law to conclude that relying on legislation is the
best way to draw a line for de facto life sentences.120 Additionally,
the court cited Illinois case law that agreed it should be left to the
legislature to define penalties and terms of imprisonment in our
society.121
The Buffer court specifically relied on section 5-4.5-105 of the
Illinois Unified Code of Corrections,122 specifically subsection (c),
which provides:
(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if the defendant is
convicted of first degree murder and would otherwise be subject to
sentencing under clause (iii), (iv), (v), or (vii) of subparagraph (c) of
paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of Section 5-8-1 of this Code based on
the category of persons identified therein, the court shall impose a
sentence of not less than 40 years of imprisonment.123

The court then analyzed the language in section 5-4.5-105(c), and
concluded that because the General Assembly determined 40 years
was the “mandatory minimum sentence” for juvenile offenders, “the
legislature evidently believed that this 40-year floor for juvenile
offenders who commit egregious crimes complies with the
requirements of Miller.”124 The court used this reasoning “to draw a
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. The court quoted several common law cases: “The United States
Supreme Court has ‘pinpointed that the “clearest and most reliable objective
evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s
legislatures.”’” Id. (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)); see also
Buffer, 137 N.E.3d at 772 (“[t]he fixing of prison terms for specific crimes
involves a substantive penological judgement that, as a general matter, is
‘properly within the province of legislatures, not courts.’”) (quoting Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment, joined by O’Connor and Souter, JJ.)).
121. See Buffer, 137 N.E.3d at 773 (quoting and referencing Illinois court
cases that support the idea of legislation deciding terms of imprisonment and
penalties).
122. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text (explaining this statute
and its purpose).
123. Buffer, 137 N.E.3d at 773 (quoting 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-105(c))
(emphasis added).
124. Id. at 773-74.
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line” of a juvenile’s sentence at 40 years.125 It explained that its
choice of the 40-year line did not come from other “court decisions,
legal literature, or statistical data.”126 Yet, the court also tried to
make it clear that this number was “not drawn from a hat.”127 It
relied on existing legislation because it believed the legislature was
“best suited to make such a determination.”128 The Buffer court
concluded by defining Illinois juvenile de facto life sentences as any
term-of-years sentence over 40 years.129
2. The Concurrence and Alternate Opinions
While 40 years could be a justified choice in drawing the line
for de facto life sentences, this should be backed up by a reason that
explains why a term of 40 years imposes a de facto life sentence in
prison. Such a reason should be based on the conclusion that
juveniles would not likely have a meaningful opportunity for release
after a period longer than 40 years.130 The Buffer majority does state
that “a prison sentence of 40 years or less imposed on a juvenile
offender provides ‘some meaningful opportunity to obtain release
based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.’”131 However,
this comment agrees more with the assertion put forth in Justice
Burke’s concurrence that the majority should have made some sort
of “mathematical calculation.”132 While this comment does not
support the idea of using a predictive life span table,133 it does assert
that the definition of a de facto life sentence should come from some
data, analysis, or popular belief that supports sentencing juveniles
to a specific term-of-years span will create a de facto life sentence.
Justice Burke’s concurrence pokes holes in the majority’s
reasoning and illustrates the impractical reasoning behind the
majority’s conclusion.134 Justice Burke stated the majority made “an
unjustified leap” in drawing the line for de facto life sentencing at
40 years when it stated section 5-4.5-105(c) evidences a “belie[f] that
[a] 40-year floor” for this type of sentencing “complies with the
requirements of Miller.”135
125. Id. at 774.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (detailing the importance of
“meaningful opportunity for release” in this comment and in sentencing
juveniles).
131. Buffer, 137 N.E.3d at 774.
132. Id. at 776 (Burke, J., concurring).
133. See infra notes 194-208 and accompanying text (detailing why life
expectancy tables should not be used in analyzing what determines a de facto
life sentence).
134. Buffer, 137 N.E.3d at 777-78 (Burke, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 777 (Burke, J., concurring).
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First, Justice Burke asserted that when enacting the section,
the legislature was thinking about what minimum sentences must
still be met when sentencing juveniles to “the specified types of
murder listed in th[is] subsection[;]” the legislature was not
imposing a minimum sentence of 40 years because it was
considering de facto life sentences or “the life expectancy of
juveniles.”136 Section 5-4.5-105(c) became effective on January 1,
2016,137 but Illinois did not find de facto life sentences
unconstitutional until September 22, 2016.138 This supports Justice
Burke’s assumption that the legislature was not thinking about de
facto life sentences or what term-of-years may constitute a life
sentence when creating the section relied upon in Buffer to draw the
40-year-line.139
In making her second argument, Justice Burke pointed out
that:
[T]he majority claims to be “extrapolating” from the legislature's
requirement in section 5-4.5-105(c), that a minimum sentence of 40
years must be imposed for certain offenses, to find that 40 years is
the maximum sentence that may be imposed without becoming a de
facto life sentence. The majority provides no explanation for this
maneuver.140

Third, she emphasized that “it is this court’s responsibility to
decide whether the legislature’s sentencing scheme is
constitutional, not the other way around.”141 Justice Burke further
asserted that the legislature is not the entity to make the decision
of “whether its own statutory scheme is unconstitutional[.]”142
This comment agrees that the legislature was not deciding
what a de facto life sentence was when composing section 5-4.5-105.
Rather, the section lays out characteristics of youth that must be
considered and is largely related to the holding in Miller.143 While
the Illinois legislature could define de facto life sentencing in a
statute, it has yet to do so. Illinois legislatures should enact a
statute clearly defining what a de facto life sentence is, and it should
do so by looking at cases that analyze this specific issue. However,
this would not include looking at the reasoning in Buffer because
the Supreme Court of Illinois mistakenly relies on a statute that is
not intended to define de facto life sentencing.

136. Id. (Burke, J., concurring).
137. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-105.
138. Reyes, 63 N.E.3d at 888.
139. Buffer, 137 N.E.3d at 777 (Burke, J., concurring).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 778 (Burke, J., concurring).
142. Id.
143. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text (explaining the section
and its purpose).
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B. Section 5-4.5-115: Meaningful Opportunity for
Release in the Form of Parole
In June 2019, the Illinois General Assembly enacted Public Act
100-1182, which added section 5-4.5-115 to the Illinois Uniform
Code of Corrections, titled “Parole review of persons under the age
of 21 at the time of the commission of an offense[.]”144 This section
provides an opportunity for parole for those “under the age of 21 at
the time of the commission of an offense.”145 The statute provides:
A person under 21 years of age at the time of the commission of an
offense or offenses, other than first degree murder, and who is not
serving a sentence for first degree murder and who is sentenced on or
after June 1, 2019 . . . shall be eligible for parole review by the
Prisoner Review Board after serving 10 years or more of his or her
sentence or sentences, except for those serving a sentence or
sentences for: (1) aggravated criminal sexual assault who shall be
eligible for parole review by the Prisoner Review Board after serving
20 years or more of his or her sentence or sentences or (2) predatory
criminal sexual assault of a child who shall not be eligible for parole
review by the Prisoner Review Board under this Section.146

The statute also establishes that those who are under the age of 21
at the time of their offense serving sentences for first degree murder
have the chance for parole after serving 20 years of their
sentence.147
The statute lists three reasons for determining an offender is
not eligible for parole: first, there is a “substantial risk” that the
offender will not comply with the terms of his release; second,
releasing the offender at the time of his or her parole hearing would
“deprecate the seriousness of his or her offense or promote
disrespect for the law[;]” and third, “the eligible person’s release
would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional
discipline.”148
In addition to providing reasons not to release an offender, the
statute also states that the Prisoner Review Board must consider
the mitigating circumstances of youth, as well as any demonstrated
“growth or maturity of the youthful offender during
incarceration.”149 Additionally, “[i]f the Prisoner Review Board
denies parole[,] . . . it shall issue a written decision which states the
rationale for denial, including the primary factors considered.”150
144. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-115. This was renumbered to 5-4.5-115
after having been previously numbered as 5-4.5-110. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at § 5/5-4.5-115(b).
147. Id.
148. Id. at § 5/5-4.5-115(j).
149. Id.
150. Id. at § 5/5-4.5-115(l).
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This statute is a great step for Illinois in creating meaningful
opportunities for release. The mandating of parole provides juvenile
offenders with the hope that they may be released from prison, and
the opportunity to demonstrate growth and maturity.151

C. Federal Circuit Courts Apply De Facto Life
Sentencing
1. Federal Circuit Courts’ Narrow Interpretation of Miller
and Graham
Federal Circuit Courts are split on whether to extend the
holdings of Roper, Graham, and Miller to de facto life sentences.
There are decisions in the Fifth,152 Sixth,153 and Eighth Circuits154
that all decline to extend these holdings to consecutive sentences or
lengthy term-of-year sentences.155 These courts narrowly interpret
the decisions in Graham and Miller to only apply to mandatory
penalty schemes that prevent accounting for the mitigating factors
of youth.156 However, at least some of these courts recognize that,
while narrow in its holding, the words of Roper, Graham, and Miller
can apply to all juvenile sentences that amount to spending life in

151. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736 (stating that “[a]llowing [juvenile]
offenders to be considered for parole ensures that juveniles whose crimes
reflected only transient immaturity—and who have since matured—will not be
forced to serve a disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth
Amendment”).
152. See Walton, 537 F. App’x at 437 (holding that Graham and Miller are
not applicable to a “discretionary federal sentence for a term of years”).
153. See Goins, 556 F. App’x at 440 (finding that Miller does not require the
considering of mitigating youthful circumstances when sentencing a juvenile to
a term-of-years sentence); Starks, 659 F. App’x at 280 (holding that the United
States Supreme Court has not found that the Eighth Amendment extends to de
facto life sentences).
154. See Jefferson, 816 F.3d at 1018-19 (declined to apply Miller to
discretionary, non-mandatory life sentences).
155. Walton, 537 F. App’x at 437; Goins, 556 F. App’x at 440; Starks, 659 F.
App’x at 280-81; Jefferson, 816 F.3d at 1019.
156. For example, the Jefferson court stated:
The Court in Miller did not hold that the Eighth Amendment
categorically prohibits imposing a sentence of life without parole
on a juvenile offender. Rather, the Court held that
the mandatory penalty schemes at issue prevented the
sentencing judge or jury from taking into account “that the
distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological
justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile
offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes.”
Jefferson, 816 F.3d at 1018-19 (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 472) (citations
omitted).
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prison.157 Rather than allowing Illinois courts to decide how to
interpret Miller, Illinois should enact legislation that prevents
subjecting juveniles to de facto life sentences.
2. Federal Courts Define Meaningful Opportunities for
Release
Federal courts have found other reasons for deeming lengthy
sentences constitutional.158 If a juvenile offender shows signs of
rehabilitation and maturity rather than irreparable corruption, the
offender must be given the chance for release.159 For example, the
United States Supreme Court found signs of maturity when a
petitioner started an inmate boxing team and worked in the
silkscreen department.160
However, no matter the term-of-years imposed, a sentence is
considered constitutional if it provides “some meaningful
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation.”161 For example, the Fourth Circuit found that a 77
consecutive-year sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment
because Virginia provided an opportunity for geriatric parole.162
The issue with this logic is that geriatric parole is not a meaningful
opportunity for release based on the merits of the offender.163
Instead, it is a circumstantial opportunity that does not have to do
with the original sentencing.
Another example of a meaningful opportunity of release was
found by the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Texas in Juarez v. Davis, which found a prison sentence that
157. See Goins, 556 F. App’x at 440 (deciding that Miller does not directly
apply to de facto life sentences even though the decision “counsels in favor of”
doing so).
158. See Contreras, 716 F. App’x at 163 (finding an opportunity for geriatric
parole was a “meaningful opportunity to receive parole”); Juarez, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 79996 at *14 (holding a prison sentence that offered the chance of
parole after serving 40 years in prison was constitutional).
159. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736-37.
160. Id. at 736. Montgomery decided whether the petitioner’s case should be
remanded for a new sentencing or opportunity for parole so factors were not
taken as true but only used to demonstrate examples of rehabilitation. Id.
161. Graham, 560 U.S. at 75. “Those prisoners who have shown an inability
to reform will continue to serve life sentences. The opportunity for release will
be afforded to those who demonstrate the truth of Miller's central intuition—
that children who commit even heinous crimes are capable of change.”
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736.
162. Contreras, 716 F. App’x at 163. Alternatively, the petitioner’s sentence
was also deemed constitutional when the sentencing court heard mitigating
testimony from five witnesses. Id.
163. This comment agrees with the assertion that geriatric parole does not
provide a meaningful opportunity for release. Illinois has also opined that they
do support geriatric parole as a meaningful opportunity for release. Buffer, 137
N.E.3d at 772.
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offers the possibility of parole after serving 40 years of the sentence
is constitutional.164 In that case, the chance for parole after 40 years
may be a meaningful opportunity; however, a parole hearing should
be based on the growth and maturity the offender demonstrates in
order to ensure the safeguards of Miller are still being applied to
juvenile offenders.
3. Determining What a Meaningful Opportunity for Release
is
The Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits extend the
holdings of Roper, Graham, and Miller to de facto life sentences.165
The Third Circuit held that Graham applies to de facto life
sentencing, and then decided retirement age determined what was
a life sentence.166 The Third Circuit Court tried to determine a time
when adults stop living a regular work life and retire, rather than
trying to simply determine when death will occur.167 This is
something legislatures and courts should do, as juveniles should be
given a “meaningful opportunity for release.”168 Meaningful
opportunities for release should not be based on determining at
what point will a juvenile survive to see life outside of prison, rather
it should be at what point will an offender still be able to live life
once they are released.169
The Third Circuit applied this rationale when it adopted the
“rebuttable presumption that a non-incorrigible juvenile offender
should be afforded an opportunity for release before the national
age of retirement.”170 It specifically required the “uniform national
age of retirement” to avoid the inconsistencies that life expectancy
tables present when focusing only on certain characteristics of
people.171 The ages given by the Social Security Administration

164. Juarez, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79996 at *14.
165. Grant, 887 F.3d at 153; Biter, 725 F.3d at 1191-92, 1194; Budder, 851
F.3d at 1059; McKinley v. Butler, 809 F.3d 908, 914 (7th. Cir. 2016).
166. Grant, 887 F.3d at 151, 153.
167. Id. at 150 (asking the question “at what age is one still able to
meaningfully reenter society after release from prison?”).
168. Id.
169. Id. “A ‘meaningful opportunity for release’ must provide for ‘hope’ and
a chance for ‘fulfillment outside prison walls,’ ‘reconciliation with society,’ and
‘the opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and self-recognition of human
worth and potential.’” Id. (quoting Graham 560 U.S. at 79).
170. Id. at 152. It is important to note that the Third Circuit here stated that
this was “not a hard and fast rule.” Id. This comment supports the idea of tying
a “meaningful opportunity for release” not only to the opportunity to be let out
of prison, but to emphasize “meaningful” so that a juvenile offender still has the
opportunity to experience life outside of prison.
171. Id. at 151.
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range from age 62 to 67.172 It is important to note that this holding
was vacated so the Third Circuit Court of Appeals could rehear the
case en banc in February of 2019, but nevertheless, the court’s
reasoning here still tries to provide a means of providing
meaningful release.173
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit upheld a lower federal court’s
decision, to remand a de facto life sentence because it was contrary
to the law established in Graham.174 In addition, the Tenth Circuit
held that Graham applies to de facto life sentencing and renders
such sentencing unconstitutional.175 And, most notably for Illinois,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, under which Illinois sits, held
that the sentencing court should consider Miller’s holding that
“children are different” when deciding a juvenile offender’s
sentence.176 The Seventh Circuit further held that the language in
Miller extends to discretionary and de facto life sentences.177 As
illustrated, the above-mentioned United States Circuit Courts are
broadly interpreting Miller and are applying it to all sentencings
that would subject a juvenile to life in prison. This comment agrees
with this interpretation of Miller, which prohibits subjecting
juveniles to spending their entire life in prison, regardless of the
classification of their sentence.

D. Different States Take Different Approaches to De
Facto Life Sentencing
Most courts agree that long term-of-years sentencing is a de
facto life sentence, though it is questionable as to where the
sentencing line is drawn.178 Alternatively, California’s Fourth
Appellate District found that a statute precluded all sentencing in
their jurisdiction from being de facto life sentences.179 The
California statute, Section 3051,180 provided the defendant with a
172. Id.
173. Grant, 905 F.3d 285 (vacating judgement so the case may be heard en
banc).
174. Moore v. Biter, 742 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2014).
175. Budder, 851 F.3d at 1059.
176. McKinley, 809 F.3d at 911, 914.
177. Id. at 914.
178. “[M]ost courts that have considered the issue agree that a lengthy term
of years for a juvenile offender will become a de facto life sentence at some point,
although there is no consensus on what that point is.” Casiano v. Comm’r of
Corr., 115 A.3d 1031, 1045 (2015), see People v. Coty, 110 N.E.3d 1105, 1123
(Ill. App. Ct. 2018) (finding that releasing someone at age 84 was undoubtedly
a de facto life sentence), see also State v. Moore, 76 N.E. 1127, 1149 (Ohio 2016)
(holding that a 112-year sentence violated the Eighth Amendment).
179. People v. Scott, 208 Cal. Rptr. 3d 449, 460 (4th Dist. 2016).
180. The California code provides juvenile offenders with eligibility for
parole on the twenty-fifth year of their sentence. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3051
(Deering 2020).
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chance of parole after serving 25 years of his sentence.181 There, a
16-year-old offender was sentenced to 120 years of consecutive
sentencing.182 This statute fulfills Graham and Miller’s
requirements for a “meaningful opportunity for release.”183 Thus,
the sentence was affirmed.184
In addition to statutes that may provide a meaningful
opportunity for release, another thing worthy of consideration in de
facto life sentencing is consecutive sentences. The Superior Court of
Pennsylvania held that de facto life sentences without parole are
unconstitutional.185 However, in cases that involve more than one
homicide, each sentence for each crime was evaluated separately
when determining whether the sentence is a de facto life
sentence.186 The court held that two consecutive sentences adding
up to 60 years to life was constitutional when the appellant killed
two different people.187 The Pennsylvania court reasoned that this
holding was necessary to maintain valid sentencing of those who
commit multiple murders as juveniles.188
Similarly, in Missouri a defendant argued that “his aggregated
sentences for seven nonhomicide offenses” failed to provide him a
“meaningful opportunity for release.”189 There, the court held that
Graham did not address offenders who committed multiple
offenses; it addressed only one single nonhomicidal offense.190 It
further found that “the [United States] Supreme Court has never
held that consecutive lengthy sentences for multiple crimes in
excess of a juvenile's life expectancy is the functional equivalent of
life without parole.”191
Alternatively, Connecticut law192 establishes that the
functional equivalent of a life sentence happens when someone is
sentenced to a minimum of 60 years in prison.193 The Supreme
Court of Connecticut used the average life expectancy in males to
find that if a male was released in his sixties in today’s world, he
may have an average of eight to 10 more years outside of prison.194
181. Scott, 208 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 460.
182. Id. at 450-51.
183. Id. at 461.
184. Id.
185. Commonwealth v. Foust, 180 A.3d. 416, 420 (Pa. 2018).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 420-21.
188. Id. at 436. The court reasoned that each individual sentence was
already shortened due to mitigating factors of youth and declared this sentence
unconstitutional which would provide a discounted sentence for all juveniles
who commit multiple murders. Id.
189. Willbanks v. State Dep’t of Corr., 522 S.W.3d 238, 242 (Mo. 2017).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 246.
192. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-35b. (LexisNexis 2019).
193. Casiano., 115 A.3d at 1045.
194. Id. at 1046. The Court used a life expectancy table provided by the
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However, this did not account for the impact prison had on life
expectancy.195
When trying to predict life expectancy, there are indications
that life expectancy tables should not be used in determining the
life expectancy of a prisoner.196 “Life expectancy is a statistic that
represents the estimated average length of life of a group of people
whose deaths will occur over a long period of time.”197 Life
expectancy tables are an insufficient way of predicting life
expectancy because there are groups of people that have
significantly different life expectancies.198 In addition, “life
expectancy is the number that represents the center of a
distribution.”199 Using the average life expectancy in determining
life sentences ensures that almost half of the group will die before
they reach this age, and more than half if the table is not
accurate.200 Additionally, studies suggest that merely moving or

Center of Disease Control and Prevention to see that in 2014 the average life
expectancy was 76 years old in males. Id.
195. Id. One year spent incarcerated can take two years off of a person’s life.
Emily Widra, Incarceration Shortens Life Expectancy, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE
(June 26, 2017), www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/06/26/life_expectancy/.
196. Adele Cummings & Stacie Nelson Colling, There is No Meaningful
Opportunity in Meaningless Data: Why it is Unconstitutional to Use Life
Expectancy Tables in Post-Graham Sentences, 18 UC DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y
267, 293 (2014).
197. Id. at 282.
198. Groups of people such as different genders, different races, and other
factors such as region, income, education, access to healthcare, community
types, etc. will create further gaps in life expectancy tables. Id. at 280, 282.
For example, according to the estimates of both the Vital
Statistics and the Census Bureau, white females born in
1981 had, in 2001, a life expectancy of 60.6 years, for a total
life expectancy of 80.6 years. Black men born in the same
year had an estimated life expectancy of 50.3 years, for a total
life expectancy of 70.3 years, a difference of more than a
decade.
Id. at 280. Another example of the discrepancy in groups includes:
Taking into account the effect on life expectancy of variables
that have long been studied by social scientists but are not
included in U.S. Census or vital statistics reports - income,
education, region, type of community, access to regular
health care, and the like - further widens the observed and
projected gaps in life expectancy between disadvantaged and
privileged groups in the United States.
Id. at 282.
199. Id. at 281.
200. For example:
A society whose members all either die at birth or live to 100
has a life expectancy of 50 years, as does a society in which
everyone lives exactly 50 years. In the first society, people's
actual life expectancy is wrong by exactly 50 years for every
individual (maximum variance); in the second, the life
expectancy of the group is exactly the length of life of every
member (zero variance).

64

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[53:Article1stPg

adjusting the average life expectancy age of prisoners is an overly
simplistic fix as groups of people are affected differently by
incarceration.201
When determining what a de facto life sentence is, some courts
look to life expectancy.202 However, life expectancy is not an
accurate tool that courts or legislatures should use in determining
whether someone has been sentenced to life.203 Life expectancy
tables calculate the rate at which a group of people will die.204 They
provide a center distribution age of death for this group.205 This
means half of the ages of death calculated occur before the center
number provided.206
Prison sentences that prevent people from being released until
shortly before they reach average life expectancy ensures that almost
one-half of them will have died before they reach that age. This is true
when the estimate of average life expectancy for that group is
perfectly accurate and precise. And if people facing or serving prison
terms that approach the life expectancy of the general population
actually have a lower life expectancy, then fewer than one-half will
have any opportunity for release, because they will have died.207

Life expectancy tables do not provide an opportunity for meaningful
release and should not be used when determining a juvenile
sentence.208
Additionally, if a life expectancy tool is used, then there must
be room built in to account for what constitutes meaningful
release.209 The Supreme Court of Connecticut held in Casiano v.
Commissioner of Correction that a statute which provided eight to
ten years outside of prison, according to the life expectancy of males,
was a valid meaningful opportunity for release.210 They also

Id.

201. Fiona G. Kouyoumdjian et al., Do People Who Experience Incarceration
Age More Quickly? Exploratory Analyses Using Retrospective Cohort Data on
Mortality from Ontario, Canada, PLOS (Apr. 14, 2017), www.journals.plos.org
/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0175837.
202. The court used the average life expectancy from a life expectancy table
provided by the Center of Disease Control and Prevention to observe that in
2014, the average life expectancy was 76 years old in males. Casiano, 115 A.3d
at 1046.
203. Cummings & Colling, supra note 196, at 283.
204. “Life expectancy is ‘the average number of years a person can expect to
live if current mortality trends were to continue for the rest of that person's
life.’” Id. at 278 (citations omitted).
205. “Life expectancy is the number representing the center of a
distribution. Another important characteristic of distributions is how widely
dispersed around the center the numbers are.” Id. at 281.
206. Id. at 283.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 294.
209. Grant, 887 F.3d at 151.
210. Casiano, 115 A.3d at 1045-46.
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acknowledged that the life expectancy table did not take into
account the effect that prison had on the life expectancy of those
spending most of their life in prison.211

E. How Prisoners’ Life Expectancy is Diminished in
Prison
Although it is unclear how to measure the perfect life
expectancy for everyone, it is undeniable that incarceration
negatively impacts the life expectancy of prisoners.212 Every year
spent in prison can take two years off of an individual’s life
expectancy.213 Professor Evelyn Patterson conducted a study of New
York state paroles and incarcerations for how it affected mortality,
and her findings revealed that “five years in prison increased the
odds of death by 78 [percent] and reduced the expected life span at
age 30 by 10 years.”214 This showed a direct correlation between
“time served” in prison and the “years of life” that a prisoner
loses.215 Professor Patterson’s study pointed out that there is a “15.6
percent increase in the odds of death for parolees compared to
people who had never been to prison.”216
Illinois should use this information to create legislation that
prevents juvenile de facto life sentencing. Additionally, Illinois
should provide legislation that allows juvenile offenders a
meaningful opportunity for release.

IV. PROPOSAL
Now, this comment will propose a solution for Illinois in
determining what a de facto life sentence is. First, it will explain
why determining an exact life expectancy for juvenile offenders is
not necessary or possible. This section will discuss more meaningful
ways of determining release and how it should be implemented.
Finally, this section will propose a resolution that will provide all
juveniles with a “meaningful opportunity for release,” rather than
the false hope of being released.
Illinois should not only uphold the principles of Miller in its
courts, but also it should strengthen these principles in its
legislation. Not only should Illinois define what a de facto life
211. Id. at 76.
212. Widra, supra note 195.
213. Id.
214. Id. (citing Evelyn J. Patterson, The Dose-Response of Time Served in
Prison on Mortality: New York State, 1989-2003, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 523
(2013)).
215. Widra, supra note 195.
216. Jim Patterson, Prison Time Cuts Lifespan Until Parole Ends, FUTURITY
(Feb. 6, 2013), www.futurity.org/prison-time-cuts-lifespan-until-parole-ends/.
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sentence is, but also it should put in additional safeguards to ensure
that juveniles are protected from this type of sentencing.

A. Eliminating Juvenile De Facto Life Sentencing
First, Illinois should establish, by way of legislation, an age
limit at which a juvenile offender’s sentence must end, unless they
are deemed an incorrigible offender or irreparably corrupt.217 Since
age is considered at the time of the commission of the offense, it
should also be an important factor at the time of release in order to
ensure offenders will still be young enough to experience life outside
of prison. Life expectancy tables should not be used to determine
this age limit because they do not factor in the many deteriorating
circumstances that juveniles face while in prisons. Therefore, the
age they determine will be significantly higher than is accurate.218
Furthermore, life expectancy tables should not be used because
Illinois should try to determine a meaningful opportunity for
release, rather than just seeking to release the offender
immediately prior to his death.
Juvenile offenders should be released before the time that
average adults are ready to start retiring from an average life of
working.219 Therefore, this comment proposes that the age limit for
release should be no later than 60 years old. As Grant analyzed,
ages of retirement span between 62 and 67.220 However, it is
important to remember that this is only true of adults who do not
have a deteriorated life span due to life in prison.221 In order for
juvenile offenders to have a meaningful opportunity for release,
they should be able to have a chance to start a life upon release.
217. An incorrigible offender is “[a] criminal who, having been punished for
illegal activities, resumes those activities after the punishment has been
completed.” Recidivist, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining
“recidivist” as synonymous with “habitual offender”); see also Habitual
Offender, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “habitual
offender” as synonymous with “incorrigible offender”).
218. Cummings & Colling, supra note 196, at 283.
219. For example, Grant explained the importance of being
released before a retirement age:
“[I]n order to effectuate the Eighth Amendment's
requirement of meaningful opportunity for release, a juvenile
offender that is found to be capable of reform should
presumptively be afforded an opportunity for release at some
point before the age of retirement. A sentence that preserves
the juvenile offender's opportunity to contribute productively
to society inherently provides him or her with "hope" to
"reconcil[e] with society" and achieve "fulfillment outside
prison walls."
Grant, 887. F.3d at 150-51 (citations omitted).
220. Id. at 151.
221. Patterson, supra note 216.
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Thus, they should be released before age 60, so they have the chance
to do so.
Second, if a juvenile offender is determined to be incorrigible
or irreparably corrupt, then the court must explicitly explain why
the juvenile is deemed to be an incorrigible offender.222 This must
be more than simply the crime committed, it must be the mindset
and lack of rehabilitation present in the offender. This would be
beneficial so that Illinois courts can remain consistent in their
determinations of what makes an offender incorrigible. It will also
help the Illinois appellate courts determine whether the reasoning
by the trial courts truly makes the juvenile offender incorrigible.
Defining what makes an offender incorrigible requires sentencing
courts to look at the offender’s characteristics of youth, childhood
experiences, and circumstances surrounding the offense, and then
determine that the offender cannot be rehabilitated.223 This is
another way to prevent courts from subjecting juvenile offenders to
life in prison without measuring all of the circumstances
surrounding the crime and offender.224
In effect, this legislation should abrogate225 the holding in
Buffer.226 In this case, abrogating Buffer is necessary in order to
truly provide an accurate description of what a juvenile offender de
facto life sentence is. Buffer does not accomplish this, as it
improperly relies on legislation that does not consider de facto life
sentencing, but rather only considers juvenile sentencing as a whole
without factoring in de facto sentences.227 Because this legislation
considers an age limit rather than a term-of-years, the proposed
sentencing statute may not always follow the holding in Buffer.
Thus, the new legislation should abrogate Buffer and explicitly
state that Buffer should not be considered when deciding whether a
juvenile sentence is a de facto life sentence.228

222. Illinois is already doing this in their new parole statute. 730 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/5-4.5-115(l). However, they should also do this at the time of sentencing,
if the sentencing court finds a juvenile de facto life sentence should be imposed.
223. The Court in Miller held that courts may determine a juvenile offender
incorrigible, but “require [the sentencing court] to take into account how
children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably
sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-80.
224. Id.
225. Abrogate: “To abolish (a law or custom) by formal or authoritative
action; to annul or repeal.” Abrogate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
226. Rush Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Sessions, 980 N.E.2d 45, 50 (Ill. 2012).
“Common law rights and remedies remain in full force in this state unless
expressly repealed by the legislature or modified by court decision.” Id.
227. See supra Part III.A.2 (analyzing why Buffer improperly relies on a
statute in defining juvenile de facto life sentences).
228. Sessions, 980 N.E.2d at 50. “Any legislative intent to abrogate the
common law must be plainly and clearly stated, and such intent will not be
presumed from ambiguous or questionable language.” Id.
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B. Parole Opportunities for Juvenile Offenders
Alternatively, Illinois should keep a statute eliminating the
impossibility of parole for non-incorrigible juvenile offenders but
should ensure the statute provides a meaningful opportunity for
release to all juvenile offenders who are not irreparably corrupt.
This statute must consider more than the average age of retirement,
as juvenile offenders drastically lose years off of their life while in
prison.229 The age for granting a parole review should be no later
than 45 years old.230 If juvenile offenders are spending the majority
of their life in prison, then their life expectancy is drastically lower
than that of an average individual.231 The new parole statute in
place for juvenile offenders, section 5/5-4.5-115, seems to align with
these guidelines and the majority of this statute should remain good
law.232
For those juvenile offenders whose crimes are not first degree
murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault, or predatory criminal
sexual assault of a child, an opportunity for parole should be
presented after 10 years spent in prison.233 This comment agrees
with the new parole statute on this matter. It also allows an
opportunity for parole for juvenile offenders who committed first
degree murder, after serving 20 years of their life sentence.234
However, the statute should also include that those who are serving
229. “For every year spent behind bars, a person’s overall life expectancy
decreases by two years.” Patterson, supra note 216.
230. The social security administration provides ages of retirement
spanning between 62 and 67 years old. Grant, 887 F.3d at 151. However, studies
show that spending a year in prison can take two years off of your life.
Patterson, supra note 216. This makes 45 years old a more appropriate age for
release than anywhere in an offender’s 60s because their life span will have
been drastically reduced by incarceration. Id.
231. Id.
232. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-115.
233. Id. This guideline is still in line with the new parole statute:
A person under 21 years of age at the time of the commission
of an offense or offenses, other than first degree murder, and
who is not serving a sentence for first degree murder and who
is sentenced on or after June 1, 2019 (the effective date of
Public Act 100-1182) shall be eligible for parole review by the
Prisoner Review Board after serving 10 years or more of his
or her sentence or sentences, except for those serving a
sentence or sentences for: (1) aggravated criminal sexual
assault who shall be eligible for parole review by the Prisoner
Review Board after serving 20 years or more of his or her
sentence or sentences or (2) predatory criminal sexual
assault of a child who shall not be eligible for parole review
by the Prisoner Review Board under this Section.
Id. at § 5-4.5-115(b).
234. Id.
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sentences for aggravated criminal sexual assault or predatory
criminal sexual assault of a child be given an opportunity for parole
by the time they reach age 45.235 As de facto life sentences are
unconstitutional for all except the rare individual showing
irreparable corruption,236 a meaningful opportunity for release
should also be afforded to them, or, alternatively, Illinois must
define in its legislation that these offenses are in the narrow
category of offenses that demonstrate irreparable corruption.237
The Prisoner Review Board may base this determination off of
the severity of the crime, while also considering any mitigating and
aggravating factors surrounding the circumstances of the offender’s
youth. To determine what is a mitigating or aggravating factor, the
court should look to the relevant crime sentencing statute and the
sentencing statute for juveniles, section 5/5-4.5-105.238 The Prisoner
Review Board should also look for signs that the offender
experienced rehabilitation, growth, or maturity while in prison.239
If the offender shows signs of maturity and growth, the offender
should be released on parole. Alternatively, if the offender shows no
signs of growth or rehabilitation, parole should be denied.
The Prisoner Review Board should give the same consideration
that sentencing judges must give when determining whether an
offender showed transient characteristics of youth at the time of the
offense, or whether the offender is incorrigible.240 This is different
from an actual sentencing because now the juvenile offenders have
served years in prison and their actions as adults may now be
examined. Rather than trying to predict maturity as an adult, the
Prisoner Review Board can actually review the offender’s actions as
an adult. These factors should include whether the offender has
committed any harmful or offensive acts while incarcerated.241
These factors should also include productivity while incarcerated,
such as any skills learned, jobs performed, or education received.242
If the offender has made more steps towards rehabilitation rather
235. Currently these types of offenders are not eligible for parole under
Section 5-4.5-115(b). Id.
236. Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-80 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 573; Graham, 560
U.S. at 68).
237. Roper explains that there exists “the underlying principle that the
death penalty is reserved for a narrow category of crimes and offenders.” 543
U.S. at 568-69. Similarly, a narrow category of offenses may exist for
irreparably corrupt offenders. However, if Illinois finds this to be true, the
legislation should make it clear that certain crimes fall within this category and
deem an offender to be irreparably corrupt.
238. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-105.
239. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-115(j).
240. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736.
241. “Those prisoners who have shown an inability to reform will continue
to serve life sentences. The opportunity for release will be afforded to those who
demonstrate the truth of Miller’s central intuition—that children who commit
even heinous crimes are capable of change.” Id.
242. Id.
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than towards recidivism, then he or she should be given an
opportunity for parole.243

V. CONCLUSION
Illinois has already declared that de facto life sentences are an
unconstitutional fate for juvenile offenders that are not irreparably
corrupt.244 Illinois should further the holding in People v. Reyes by
passing legislation that does not allow juveniles who are not
incorrigible to be sentenced past the age of 60. Illinois should also
pass legislation that does not allow these juveniles to spend life in
prison past the age of 45 without the opportunity for meaningful
release. In effect, this legislation should expressly state that it is
repealing the holding in Buffer. This opportunity must be a parole
hearing that affords consideration of the mitigating factors of the
offender’s maturity and rehabilitation. This statute should allow
those who committed crimes, that were not first degree murder,
criminal sexual assault, or predatory criminal sexual assault of a
child, an opportunity for parole after ten years. Juvenile offenders
who commit more serious crimes, such as first degree murder,
should be considered for parole after 20 years. Those juvenile
offenders who committed criminal sexual assault or predatory
criminal sexual assault of a child should be considered for parole by
age 45. This new legislation will truly provide juvenile offenders
with meaningful opportunity of release rather than a life
condemned to prison.
Meaningful release means giving a juvenile the chance to leave
prison and have some semblance of a life outside of confinement.
There are two major ways to prevent subjecting juveniles to
spending their entire life in prison. The first is implementing a set

243. The Court in Montgomery v. Louisiana found that petitioner had made
steps towards rehabilitation during his time incarcerated when:
Petitioner has discussed in his submissions to this Court his
evolution from a troubled, misguided youth to a model
member of the prison community. Petitioner states that he
helped establish an inmate boxing team, of which he later
became a trainer and coach. He alleges that he has
contributed his time and labor to the prison’s silkscreen
department and that he strives to offer advice and serve as a
role model to other inmates. These claims have not been
tested or even addressed by the State, so the Court does not
confirm their accuracy. The petitioner’s submissions are
relevant, however, as an example of one kind of evidence that
prisoners might use to demonstrate rehabilitation.
Id. Although these were just examples of how the petitioner may have
changed, if the petitioner has truly shown this type of change, parole
should be achieved.
244. Reyes, 63 N.E.3d at 888.
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time of release. However, the time limitation proposed, age 60, is
still the majority of a prisoner’s life. This is enough to incentivize
not committing the crime in the first place.
The second major way to accomplish this goal is finding ways
to make sure the offender’s parole hearing is providing a
“meaningful opportunity for release.” This is supported by not only
setting requirements that allow opportunities for release, but also
by making judges or the Prisoner Review Board give explicit
reasoning as to why someone is not being resentenced or released
on parole. This will ensure the reasons set forth are in line with the
reasons established in Miller. It also ensures that they will consider
all circumstances of youth and factors of rehabilitation upon parole
review. This proposed legislation prevents subjecting a juvenile to
spending their life behind bars for mistakes made during their
childhood.
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